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one-hundred-year life cycle for global
hegemons, Liu names the champions: Portugal in the sixteenth century,
Holland in the seventeenth century,
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and America in the twentieth
century. Maybe China had a fleeting
world championship title in the fifteenth
century—not through colonial conquest,
but through tributary recognition of the
center of world power. Liu’s argument is
that China is back—to claim the champion’s title in the twenty-first century.
The rest of the book elaborates how
China can become the world champion
by drawing on lessons from former
and current champions, especially the
United States. For instance, Liu notes
that American strategy included an
internal strengthening phase of isolationism under President Washington, a
century of regional consolidation under
the Monroe Doctrine, and world power
generation under FDR’s globalism. He
also likes America’s “cheap rise”: in
other words, coming late to both world
wars, but concluding those wars with
the victor’s share of the spoils. Comparing China to America, Liu notes that
China underwent domestic consolidation under Mao and Deng, and has
its eye on being king of Asia, with the
ultimate goal of being king of the world.
The first champion’s goal, toward
achievement of which China is well on
the way, is to become the wealthiest
nation—because all world champions
have been the wealthiest nation. All
world champions have also been the
strongest military power—hence the
focus on martial spirit. In terms of strategy, Liu prefers Sun Tzu to Clausewitz,
pointing out that China will seek to win
without fighting. In what may seem like
a non sequitur to Americans and many
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others, Liu continually repeats the theme
that “the first nonhegemonic champion
nation in history will appear, and that
nation is China.” However, he also refers
on multiple occasions to China as king,
and the difference between kingly thinking and hegemonic thinking is ironically
opaque. Liu refers to the United States
as “one country, two systems,” meaning democracy at home and hegemony
abroad. Since Liu prefers to see China
exercise democracy abroad and hegemony at home, we could also refer to
China as “one country, two systems,” but
with practices inverted from those of the
United States of his characterization.
For those who like the sporting analogy, the book is an entertaining read
and an enticement to place one’s bets
on the grand sporting event of world
politics. On a more sober note, Liu’s
world view rings more true to current
Chinese policies than to those of five
years ago. President Xi Jinping gave his
“China Dream” speech in November
2012, apparently somewhat influenced
by Liu Mingfu’s book of the same title
published two years earlier. Thus, the recent translation is food for thought that
should be chewed on by a wider Western
audience now that it is available.
GRANT RHODE

Logistics in the Falklands War, by Kenneth L.
Privratsky. Barnsley, U.K.: Pen & Sword, 2015.
248 pages. $34.95.

Major General Kenneth Privratsky,
USA (Ret.), highlights the importance
of the integration of combat operations
and logistics in this book about the
Falklands War of 1982. Logistics in the
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Falklands War is the result of years of
research, begun when Privratsky was
at the Army’s Command and General
Staff College in the mid-1980s and
continued while a fellow at Stanford’s
Hoover Institution. Most of all, the
author wants the reader to “appreciate the extent of the efforts behind the
victory” rather than simply present
a logistical view of lessons learned.
The book begins by examining British
and Argentine claims on the Falkland
Islands before walking through the
sequence of Argentina’s invasion threat
and subsequent invasion; Britain’s mobilization and deployment; combat operations; and the aftermath of the conflict.
He highlights the key role of industry
during the rapid mobilization. Commercial ships were quickly modified for
the war. For example, the cruise ship
Uganda was converted to a hospital ship
in only sixty-five hours once it reached
the shipyard. This included modifying
its interior spaces for a clinic, surgical
facilities, and labs; installing a helicopter deck; adding equipment to produce
fresh water; and applying Red Cross
markings. In total, fifty-four ships were
taken up from trade, outnumbering the
number of warships involved. Privratsky
aptly describes the outload as rushed
and gives readers a sense of being on
the docks during the unchoreographed
flurry of activity. Many converted commercial ships were designed only for
pier-side off-loading; however, once in
theater, supplies and equipment had
to be transferred to vessels capable of
shallow-water operations. Off-loading
difficulties and concerns over Argentine
air strikes sent Queen Elizabeth 2 home
with “seventy percent of 5 Brigade’s 81
mm mortar and 105 mm gun ammunition . . . buried in lower decks.”
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Privratsky argues convincingly that
logistics was the center of gravity of the
campaign. The movement of ammunition, supplies, and equipment—whether
by shallow water–capable ships, helicopters, or backpacks—dictated the pace of
the ground war. The author’s thorough
research, including interviews, leads
to a comprehensive description of the
combat operations and movement of
supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore
of East Falkland on D-Day, 21 May 1982,
to the surrender on 14 June 1982, at Port
Stanley, the capital on the east shore of
East Falkland. The British, with their
firm resolve and their jointly trained and
professional military forces, tirelessly got
the right supplies to the right place. His
vivid description of the harsh conditions
on the Falkland Islands reinforces the
importance of the integration of combat
operations and logistics. Nevertheless,
although that integration was successful,
“[b]y the time the Argentines surrendered in Stanley, some [British] artillery
batteries were on their last rounds.”
In many ways, Britain embarked on a
“come as you are, bring what you can”
affair to reclaim the Falkland Islands
from Argentina. The remote islands’
formidable terrain and inhospitable
climate—along with the hostile Argentine military forces—exacerbated the
difficulty of moving supplies and equipment, which directly impeded combat
operations. As Privratsky writes, “Wars
sometimes occur at times and in places
least expected.” And a lack of bullets,
beans, and fuel can cause unplanned
pauses to a campaign plan or, worse
yet, leave troops alone and exposed.
Privratsky firmly believes that effective
combat operations are enabled by integrating combat and logistics units and
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conducting realistic training. Privratsky’s
insights could also apply to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a
natural disaster has destroyed piers or
off-loading equipment, or occurred in a
remote location without prepositioned
stores. Military operational planners and
military history enthusiasts should add
this book to their professional library.
CYNTHIA K. SEXTON

The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory, ed. James B. Lewis.
London: Routledge, 2015. 418 pages. $178.

The Japanese invasion of Korea, known
in the West as the Imjin War, has been
largely overlooked by Western scholars. While Stephen Hawley’s The Imjin
War and Kenneth Swopes’s A Dragon’s
Head and a Serpent’s Tail are excellent works, those wishing for a more
thorough treatment of some of the
issues leading to the war and a more
succinct history of the war itself have
had to rely on Korean- or Japaneselanguage sources. However, James B.
Lewis’s The East Asian War, 1592–1598:
International Relations, Violence, and
Memory now fills the void, offering a
variety of perspectives on this seminal
conflict among Korea, China, and Japan.
Lewis has assembled an impressive list
of international scholars representing
a variety of academic specialties. This
book is far more than a simple military
or political history of one of Asia’s largest
conflicts prior to the twentieth century.
It is divided into three parts, the first an
examination of the international and
domestic background to the conflict.
Japanese and Korean scholars assess
the issues that led to a deterioration
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of relations between Korea and Japan. Economic issues, including trade
disputes, predominate in this section,
and set the stage for a review of the war
itself, which is the subject of the next
part of the book, simply entitled “War.”
The nine chapters that compose the section on the Imjin War present the reader
with a wealth of information previously
unavailable to an English-language
audience. These chapters rely almost
exclusively on either primary-source
material in Japanese and Korean or secondary sources from scholars in Korea,
Japan, and China who have provided
their own accounts and interpretations
of this conflict. Each of the belligerents
gets a thorough review, covering political, military, cultural, and social forces
that shaped the six-year-long tragedy
that has come to be known as the Imjin
War. From a military perspective, readers will find plenty of groundbreaking
information on the naval aspects of this
war, which featured the largest maritime
expedition in history up to that time.
The valiant resistance put up by the
Korean navy against the invading Japanese is worth a separate book in itself.
The third and final part of this book
should not be overlooked. Examining the “impact and memory” of the
Imjin War, these five final chapters
provide the reader with a review of
the ways in which this conflict helped
shape attitudes among China, Korea,
and Japan over the ensuing centuries. Whether through literature, art,
or fashion, this conflict left a lasting
impact that Western audiences would
have had a difficult time discerning
prior to the publication of this book.
There is a comprehensive glossary and
index at the end of the book; however,
the term “glossary” is a bit misleading,
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